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LOSS OF FUTURE EARNINGS: PRESENT WORTH
VERSUS WAGE GROWTH
Steven J. Harman
INTRODUCTION
In a tort action, the plaintiff is generally entitled to compensation
for all losses sustained at the hands of the defendant.' Because the
plaintiff is awarded a single lump sum, the award must reflect not
only past and present damages, but also damages expected to be in-
curred in the future. Where the injury results in death or permanent
disability, future damages more than likely will include loss of future
earnings. The doctrine of reducing future earnings to their worth plays
a significant role in determining the present amount that the plaintiff
will receive for the estimated loss of future earnings.
The scope of this note is to examine the concept of reducing future
earnings to their present worth in Montana and its validity in light of
the current rate of wage growth. Resner v. Northern Pacific Railway,2 a
recent Montana supreme court case in which the jury was allowed to
consider the possibility of future wage growth in computing the loss of
future earnings, will be discussed in some detail.
REDUCING FUTURE EARNINGS TO PRESENT WORTH
ILLUSTRATION
"It is self-evident that a given sum of money in hand is worth more
than the like sum of money payable in the future."'3 This is the premise
upon which reduction of future earnings to present worth rests. The
following illustration will aid the economic neophyte in understanding
the mechanics of reducing an estimated future loss to a present value.
4
Suppose a plaintiff is permanently disabled, and is unable to work
for the remainder of his life. If prior to his injury he earned $20,000
per year and assuming that he would have earned that salary for another
20 years, he sustained at least $400,000 in future damages.5 Should he
be awarded a $400,000 lump sum? The answer is no. The rational is
IREvIsED CODES OF MONTANA, § 17-401 (1947).
'Resner v. Northern Pacific Railway, ...... Mont ......., 505 P.2d 86 (1973).
8Chesapeake and Ohio Railway v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489 (1916).
'See, D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 8.7 (1973); R. LEASURE, HOW TO PROVE REDUCTION TO
PRESENT WORTH, 21 Ohio St.L.J. 204 (1960), reprinted in S. SCHTEIBER, DAMAGES
472 (1965).
5In reality a person would not be expected to earn a constant income. For example,
for the estimated average annual earnings, including fringe benefits of all males
with one to three years of college, by age, see, U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-60, No. 74, ANNUAL MEAN INCOME, LIFETIME INCOME,
AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF MEN IN THE UNITED STATES, FOR SELECTED YEARS
1956 TO 1968, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Table 9, Page 35).
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that the plaintiff, if presently awarded the entire sum, could safely
invest it at 5% annual interest thus producing $20,000 income per year
leaving the principal intact after 20 years. Double recovery? It cer-
tainly is. Common sense dictates that the plaintiff ought to receive a
sum which is capable of producing $20,000 per year by using both
principal and interest so that at the end of 20 years neither principal
nor interest remains.6 In order to accomplish this result, it is necessary
to discount (reduce) the estimated future earnings by a figure which
represents the interest which would accumulate on a "safe" investment.7
The discounted figure would represent the present worth of the plain-
tiff's future earnings. Based on a discount figure of 5%, an estimated
future earnings loss of $400,000 would be presently worth $254,600.8
MONTANA LAW
Montana is in accord with the generally accepted rule that damages
for loss of future earnings must be reduced to their present worth.9 This
rule applies in both personal injury 10 and wrongful death" actions.
Intangible future damages such as future pain and suffering are not
-educed to a present value since they are incapable of being ascertained
by a fixed standard.'2 Montana courts recognize the importance of
providing a guide or formula by which the jury can calculate the
present worth of future damages.' 3
The stock instruction given by the judge concerning reduction of
future earnings to present worth first requires the jury to find the
6See, Hollingsworth v. Davis-Daley E. C. Co., 38 Mont. 143, 99 P. 142, 149 (1909);
DOBBS, supra note 4 at § 8.7.
7 1n Chesapeake and Ohio Railway v. Kelly, supra note 3 at 490, the United States
Supreme Court stated: "... we do not mean to say that the discount should at at
what is commonly called the 'legal rate' of interest as the rate of interest on a
'safe' investment." However, some courts use the "legal rate" of interest as
the rate of interest on a "safe" investment. Kitchens v. Hall, 116 Ga.App. 41, 156
S.E.2d 920, 922 (1967); Troncatti v. Smereczniak, 210 Pa.Super. 329, 231 A.2d 886,
889 rev'd on other grounds, 428 Pa. 7, 235 A.2d 345 (1967). In Montana the court
allows the jury to select an appropriate interest rate. Resner v. Northern Pacific
Railway, supra note 2 at 89.
8p. WENDT and A. CERF, TABLES FOR INVESTMENT AN.ALYSIS at 53 (1966).
OResner v. Northern Pacific Railway, supra note 2 at 89; Cornell v. Great Northern
Ry. Co., 57 Mont. 177, 187 P. 902, 904 (1920); Hollingsworth v. Davis-Daley E. C.
Co., supra note 5 at 149, Bourke v. Butte Electric and Power Co., 33 Mont. 267, 83
P. 470, 476 (1905).
1 Fulton v. Chouteau County Farmer's Co., 98 Mont. 48, 37 P.2d 1025 (1934).
"Olson v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 35 Mont. 400, 89 P. 731 (1907).
"Bourke v. Butte Electric and Power Co., supra note 8 at 476. In this case the court
stated: ". . . [H]owever, the elements of physical and mental pain and suffering are
entirely uncertain, and no fixed standard can be established for ascertaining the
damages occasioned by them."
SIn Zanos v. Great Northern By. Co., 60 Mont. 17, 198 P. 138, 140 (1921) the court
noted: "I. . . but, in the instruction no rule or guide or suggestion was made to the
jury as to how it was to comply with this requirement (reduction to present worth).
This matter was one before this court . . . and we go no farther here than to call
attention to those decisions." citing Bourke v. Butte Electric and Power Co., supra
note 9 at 476.
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"dollar value" of the future damages. 14 Determining the "dollar value"
involves two separate findings by the jury: 1) the amount of the loss
($20,000 above) and 2) the length of the loss period (20 years above).
Each calculation involves its own considerations.
In determining the amount of the loss, evidence of past salaries15
and certain wage agreements indicating wage growth16 is admissible.
In some cases where the plaintiff is only partially disabled, thus able
to earn only a fraction of his previous salary, the courts hold that "...
he is entitled to an annuity equal to the difference between his annual
earnings before his injury, and the amount, if any, he might be able to
earn thereafter."' 7 In one case the loss of a left hand reduced a railroad
worker's earning capacity to half his previous annual salary.' 8 Also,
advancing age should be considered especially where the plaintiff's
earning ability depends on his physical condition.' 9 In Krohmer v. Dahl2'
the decedent was not earning a steady income as he was attending
college at the time of his death. The court held that evidence of an
expert in the field of economics was admissible to provide the jury
with a guide or basis upon which to estimate the loss of future earn-
ings.2 ' As evidenced by the following quote, the court in Krohmer
recognized the difficulty in determining the amount of the loss:
No general rule can be formulated that would control the admission
of evidence to prove a man's future earning capacity. It must be
arrived at largely from probabilities; and any evidence that would
fairly indicate his present earning capacity, and the probability of
its increase or decrease in the future ought to be admitted.'
The second determination which the jury must make in arriving
at the "dollar amount" of the future earnings loss is the length of the
period of the loss. Of the few Montana courts which discuss the figures
considered by the jury in estimating the loss period, the life expectancy
of the injured person or decedent was often used.2 3  Often mortality
tables were presented as the sole basis in determining life expectancy.2 4
Later cases indicate that while mortality tables are competent evidence
in determining the life expectancy of a person, they are not to be con-
"'MONTANA JURY INSTRUcT I N GUIDES, § 34.01.
15Lewis v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 36 Mont. 207, 92 P. 469, 475 (1907).
"Resner v. Northern Pacific Railway, supra note 2 at 89, 90.
17 Lewis v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 15 at 475, 476.
Mid.
Id. at 475.
"Krohmer v. Dahl, 145 Mont. 491, 402 P.2d 979 (1973).
91d. at 981.
"Id. at 982.
Cornell v. Great Northern Ry. Co., supra note 9 at 904; Lewis v. Northern Pacific
Railway, supra note 15 at 475; Robinson v. Helena Light and Ry. Co., 38 Mont. 222,
99 P. 837, 846 (1909); Moyse v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 41 Mont. 272, 108
P. 1062, 1069 (1970).
"Bourke v. Butte Electric and Power Co., aupra note 9 at 476.
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sidered as conclusive guides to the jury.25 Determining life expectancy
is not an exact science. As one court noted:
Even with the aid of these tables, therefore, the finding of the jury
must necessarily be based upon considerations more or less specu-
lative in character, and they must be left the exercise of their dis-
cretion unlimited by any fixed standard . .. there is no standard by
which to determine the amount of damages to be awarded other
than the intelligence of the jury. ...- '
After determining the loss period, this figure is multiplied with the
loss amount and the resulting figure represents the "dollar amount" of
the loss of future earnings. The next step is to reduce this amount to
present worth. As to how to make this reduction, a Montana jury would
probably be instructed as follows:
Present cash value is determined by a method of discount. It is a
present sum of money which, together with what money may reason-
ably be expected to earn in the future for the period you have deter-
mined (name of person) will suffer such loss, when invested at a
reasonable rate of return, will produce the dollar equivalent of such
future damage. Because of this discount requirement, the present
cash value of future damage will be a lesser sum than the amount
you have found to be such a future damage."
Expert testimony may be presented to determine what constitutes a
"reasonable rate of return. 2 8  In Montana the trend appears to be at
least 5 per cent.2 9 The 5 per cent figure will then be used to reduce the
future earnings to their present worth.
In Montana, future earnings are currently being reduced to a present
value, although it appears that recently some erosion of the rule is taking
place. The erosion is stemming from the field of economics.
WAGE GROWTH AS AFFECTING THE PRESENT WORTH RULE
THE ECONOMIST
Economists have concluded that the earnings of an individual will
increase rather than remain constant as was assumed to be the case in
the illustration above. Therefore, in order to fully compensate the plain-
tiff, allowance ought to be made for normal wage growth. The effect
of this conclusion is that rate of the future wage growth may offset
the discount rate, thus leaving the loss amount unchanged. In order
Moyse v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., supra note 23 at 1069; Robinson v. Helena
Light and Ry. Co., supra note 23 at 846.
2Cornell v. Great Northern Ry. Co., supra note 9 at 905. In Robinson v. Helena Light
and Ry. Co., supra note 9 at 846, the court relied on the following statement from
Morrison v. McAtee, 23 Or. 530, 32 P. 400: ". . . the constitution, habits, and health
of individuals differ essentially, and must be taken into consideration in estimating
the probable length of life of any given person, and therefore no ordinary table of
expectation of life . . . can be taken as the correct rule for estimating the value of
the life of any particular individual."
"MONTANA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDEs, § 34.01.
Resner v. Northern Pacific Railway, supra note 2 at 88; Krohmer v. Dahl, supra
note 20 at 981, 982.
'Resner v. Northern Pacific Railway, supra note 2 at 89.
1974]
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to better understand this proposition, the following brief explanation
provided by Dr. John P. Henderson 0 will be helpful.
Dr. Henderson concludes that:
In general, productivity and inflation are the two primary causes for
the increase in money earnings. Of the average annual increase in
hourly compensation of 54 per cent between 1946 and 1971, approxi-
mately 2.2 per cent results from increases in productivity, and 3.2
per cent results from inflation. During the recent period of marked
inflation, 1968-1971, the influence of productivity has diminished.
From 1946 through 1966, the average annual increase in compen-
sation was 5.2 per cent, of which 50 per cent was due to the increase
in productivity (2.6 per cent) and 50 per cent to inflation (2.6 per
cent) .
Increased productivity and inflation were the reasons for wage growth
in the past and Dr. Henderson believes that both causes of wage growth
will continue in the future.3 2 The rate of increase appears to be roughly
5 per cent.33 By increasing the estimated future earnings loss by 5 per
cent to allow for future wage growth, one can readily deduce that this
computation would offset discounting the same amount by 5 per cent,
thus leaving the future loss amount unchanged.3 4 This is the situation
"John P. Henderson, Professor of Economics, East Lansing, Michigan.
nHenderson, The New Economics and the Law of Damages, EXPERTS IN LITIGATION
105, 106 (1973).
'2Nd. at 108, 113. At page 113, Dr. Henderson concludes: '... [I]nflation is un-
deniably a controversial topic, but the controversy centers not on the issue of whether
the price level will rise, but on the rate of increase of prices . . . [T]he Nixon ec-
nomic policy would be considered a huge success if the increase in prices were held
to 3 to 4 per cent per annum; no one foresees the current structure of the economy
providing an increase below this rate."
"Henderson, supra note 32 at 105, 106. See also Resner v. Northern Pacific Railway,
supra note 2 at 89.
""' The idea that a 5 per cent increase in the earning capacity of an individual offsets
a 5 per cent reduction to present value was demonstrated by the decision of Judge
Noel P. Fox of the United States District Court in the Western District of Michigan
in Pierce v. New York Central Railroad Company, 304 F. Supp. 44 (W.D. Mich. 1969)
• . . The court of appeals vacated the award and remanded 'for clarification as to
the findings and a clear statement of whether and how the Michigan rule requiring
reduction of future damages was applied.' 409 F.2d 1392, 1399 (6th Cir. 1969). In
his supplemental opinion on the cause of the vacated award, Judge Fox discussed
his reason for not discounting to present value:
In the oral opinion rendered, the court attempted to show that it was offsetting
a consideration of inflation against the present worth rule. At page 14 of the
oral opinion it was said, 'Now, we have in Michigan a rule that future damages
should be brought down to present worth. But we do also know that inflation
and the ever climbing gross national product has pretty well balanced out re-
duction of damages of future earnings, or loss of future earnings to present
worth.' The mathematics of the computation are quite simple. Using the element
of loss or earning capacity, which the court concluded to be $2,500 for 35 years,
or $87,500, a reduction to present worth would have resulted in a figure of
$49,775 . . . . However, assuming an average inflationary trend of five per cent
a year, any reduction to present worth was offset . . . . Therefore the court,
fully mindful of the Michigan present worth rule, took into consideration the
inflationary trend of our nation's economy and merely made an appropriate
offset. The amount of damages should remain the same ....
For example, if one assumes that an invested dollar will earn five per cent in-
terest per annum then that dollar will increase to $2.30 after 26 years. How-
ever, if the purchasing power of a dollar is reduced five per cent per annum,
26 years hence it will require $2.30 to purchase what it presently costs $1.00 to
buy. 304 F. Supp. at 46. (Notes omitted)." Henderson, supra note 32 at 118,
119.
[Vol. 35
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that the Montana supreme court was faced with in Resner v. Northern
Pacific Railway.35 A brief discussion of this case and an interesting
Alaskan case 6 will provide insight into how courts have reacted to
evidence of wage growth and its affect on reduction of a future value
to its present worth.
RESNER v. NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY
Herbert T. Resner was killed as a result of the negligence of his
employer, Northern Pacific Railway. The jury returned a verdict for
Resner's widow in the amount of $175,000. In answer to several special
verdict questions, the jury found that 5 per cent was a reasonable rate
of increase in wages and prices and considered this figure in deter-
mining the loss of future earnings. The jury also found that 5 per cent
was a reasonable figure with which to discount future earnings to
present worth. Both figures were based on the expert testimony of Dr.
George B. Heliker.37
The defendant filed a motion for entry of judgment requesting
that the award be reduced. Defendant contended that the jury ought
not be allowed to speculate on future wage increases and to offset those
increases against the discount to present worth figures. The trial judge
agreed with the defendant's contentions and reduced the award to
$91,740.49; nearly half of the original verdict.
In determining whether or not the trial judge erred in admitting
evidence of future wage growth, the court looked at some length at the
testimony of Dr. Heliker. Dr. Heliker tesstified that wages could be
expected to increase approximately 5 per cent in the future for the
same reasons that Dr. Henderson concluded above: 1) man's produc-
tivity has increased between 3 and 31/2 per cent in the past, and 2)
prices have increased at a rate of between 1 and 11/2 per cent over the
same period. 38 Dr. Heliker commented that when these two percentages
are added together they produce ". . . just about exactly the rate of
increase from wages, about 5 per cent or a little more ...here is what
happened in the past and, as far as I can see, this same thing is going
to happen in the future." 9 He also testified that 5 per cent was a rea-
sonable discount figure. The end result was that the wage increase
figure offset the discount figure, leaving the estimated future loss amount
unchanged. After discussing Dr. Heliker's testimony, the court held that
it was properly admitted because it provided a basis upon which the
jury could estimate the loss of future earnings.'0
'Ofesner v. Northern Pacific Railway, supra note 2.
'Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665 (1967).
'George B. Heliker, Professor of Economics, University of Montana, Missoula, Mon-
tana.
'Resner v. Northern Pacific Railway, supra note 2 at 89.
RId.
'Old.
1974] NOTES
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The court next rejected the defendant's contention that future wage
increases were "speculative" and "conjectural." In support of this re-
jection the court relied on the following passage from Lavender v.
Kurn,41 a United States Supreme Court case:
It is not answer to say that the jury's verdict involved speculation
and conjecture. . Only where there is a complete absence of
probative facts to support the conclusion reached does reversible
error appear. But where . . . there is an evidentiary basis for thejury's verdict . . . the appellate court's function is exhausted."
Here, Dr. Heliker's testimony provided the basis for the jury's verdict.
Furthermore, the court discussed cases where evidence of inflation had
been considered by juries in determining future wage increases. 43 Afore
specifically, Scruggs v. Cheasapeake and Ohio Railway Co. 44 was cited
with approval for the following proposition:
The question before the jury was the pecuniary loss which would be
suffered by the plaintiff . . . in the future. The probability of in-
creases in decedent's income was certainly relevant to that issue.
It seems unlikely that their conclusion will be any less valid from
having heard the testimony objected to, and they may be much more
correct than otherwise. Inflation is a topic of almost universal dis-
cussion and it seems inmprobable that the jury could avoid taking
it into account even in the absence of any testimony about it...
In short, the Resner court held that the jury may consider wage
growth in determining loss of future earnings and expert testimony is
admissible to indicate the rate of wage growth.
Does this mean that the defendant has no recourse but to pay more
where loss of future earnings are involved? Resner indicates this result,
although the court did recognize that the defendant could bring in
experts of his own to testify as to the rate of wage increases. 46 But
is there any need to undertake this battle of experts? If, as it appears
to be the case, the wage growth rate and the discount rate are fairly
equal, it would be meaningless to have both sides produce experts to
predict the foregoing figures. Reducing future earnings to present
worth would be an exercise in futility. Yet, Alaska appears to be the
only state which has abandoned the concept of reducing future earnings
to their present worth.47 The rationale of the Alaskan court in Beaulieu
v. Elliot48 is particularly appealing in its logical simplicity as the fol-
lowing passage indicates:
... we believe that the rule for reducing awards . . . ignores facts
which should not be ignored. Annual inflation has been with us for
many years. There is no reason to expect that it will not be with us
"Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946).
OId. at 653.
Grunenthal v. Long Island Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 156 (1968); Sruggs v. Chesapeake and
Ohio Railway Co., 320 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Vir. 1970).
"Scruggs v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co., supra note 42.
"Id. at 1250, 1251.
"Resner v. Northern Pacific Railway, supra note 2 at 91.
17Beaulieu v. Elliot, supra note 37.
3Id.
[Vol. 35
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in the future .... This rate of depreciation offsets the interest that
could be earned on "safe" investments. As a result the plaintiff
.. . must, in order to realize his full earnings and not be penalized
by reduction of future earnings to present value, invest his moneys
in enterprises, other than those which are considered "safe" invest-
ments, which promise a return in interest or dividends greater than
the offsetting rate of annual inflation."
The court would not ask the plaintiff to put himself in a risky invest-
ment situation. The court held that justice could only be accomplished
by allowing the jury to determine loss of future earnings without re-
duction to present worth.50 This rule has been praised for its simplicity
and criticized for its rationale.51 The Resner court quoted the same pas-
sage as the one from Beaulieu above, yet refused to accept it.52 There-
fore, one can safely conclude that Montana judges will continue to
instruct juries to reduce loss of future earnings to present worth.
CONCLUSION
The rule of reducing loss of future earnings to present worth was
formulated to avoid overcompensating the plaintiff. Mfore specifically,
the estimated loss of future earnings had to be reduced to a present
amount which would produce a predicted income for the plaintiff by
using both the principal amount and the interest it would accumulate.
This reasoning, however, completely ignores the fact of normal wage
growth due to increases in productivity and inflation. This fact ought
to be considered in order to adequately compensate the plaintiff for his
future damages. Moreover, as the court in Beaulieu reasoned, since it
appears that the discount rate and the rate .of increase of money earnings
will remain fairly equal, there is no need to reduce loss of future earn-
ings to their present worth.53 Also, if the Beaulieu approach is followed
the burden on the jury would be considerably lightened. With the
present Montana rule set out by Resner, the jury could conceivably have
to make four separate determinations: 1) the amount of the loss; 2)
the length of the loss period; 3) the discount figure; and 4) the rate of
wage growth. If Beaulieu were followed in Montana, the jury would
have to determine only the amount of the loss in the base year and the
loss period.
The rule of reducing loss of future earnings to present worth ought
to be eliminated for two reasons: 1) the rule ignores the rate of wage
growth, thus risking undercompensation of the plaintiff, and 2) the
jury's burden would be considerably lightened.
OId. at 671.
5!d.
51DoBBs, RFXEDIES, supra note 4 at § 8.7.
"Resner v. Northern Pacific Railway, supra note 2 at 91.
"Provided the future earnings are computed as a flat projection of base earnings.
1974]
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